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I. Introduction- Religion and Politics Today………………………..…(3) 
 
In contemporary discourse, religion is frequently seen as a threat to democratic institutions 
and norms. This perception is manifest in ongoing (though perhaps weakening) judicial 
philosophies of strict separation, along with demands from the left and right that religion be 
excluded from the public square due to the divisiveness that many fear it brings. This fear 
appears to be fueled by a basic belief in the inherent divisiveness of religion, and specific 
concern about the dogmatism of some groups on the “Christian right.”  
 
 
II. Public Reason and Its Defenders…………………………………..(7) 
 
Many argue that in a deeply pluralistic society, individuals and groups should base their 
argumentation on principles that can be accepted by all members of the democratic 
community. Philosophers such as John Rawls and Robert Audi base their support for this 
position on the idea that foundational beliefs or “comprehensive doctrines” are ultimately 
irreconcilable with one another and will thus generate interminable division. 
 
 
III. Criticisms of Public Reason………………………………………..(11) 
 
The idea of public reason has met with a great deal of criticism. Many philosophers, for 
instance, call into question the idea that there is a universally-shared framework to which all 
individuals within a pluralistic society can appeal. Additionally, they suggest that even if 




IV. The Concept of a Tradition………………………………………...(15) 
 
Rawls’s notion of public reason is contingent upon an understanding of comprehensive 
doctrines as ideological structures which polarize rather than facilitate meaningful dialogue. I 
argue that this understanding of comprehensive doctrines is unnecessarily monolithic and 
does not take into account the idea of a comprehensive doctrine that functions as a “tradition 
of inquiry.” In such a tradition, overarching principles facilitate dialogue by virtue of the 
hermeneutical relationship of principles both to one another and to specific circumstances, 
issues and cases in the world. Such a tradition would therefore be very different from the 
divisive forms of comprehensive doctrine that Rawls fears. In this section, I develop the idea 
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V. A Tale of Two Religious Forms...………………………………….(25) 
 
The idea of a religious tradition is not a purely theoretical one. In this section, I lay out the 
definitions of a “faith-based advocacy organization” and a “faith tradition,” which will in the 
two subsequent sections be represented, respectively, by Focus on the Family and the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. While the members of faith-based advocacy 
organizations unite around a specific policy agenda and tend to be dogmatic and inflexible, 
faith traditions, by embedding the evaluation of policies in a thick texture of overarching 
principles and practice, can incorporate civility, humility and deliberation. 
 
VI. Faith-Based Advocacy Organization: Focus on the Family ...……..(28) 
 
Faith-based organizations pull out one particular principle or set of principles from a broader 
tradition and posit that the principle(s) they have chosen indicates inescapable policy 
outcomes. Even when they choose a form of argument that conforms to the standard of 
public reason, they remain unwilling to compromise or participate in constructive dialogue. 
Focus on the Family’s history and expressed policy positions illustrate this inflexibility. 
 
VII. Faith Tradition: Evangelical Lutheran Church in America ………..(35) 
 
Faith traditions, because they refuse to reify particular applications of their historically 
constituted principles and practices, promote a hermeneutical ethic that is conducive to 
political compromise and positive dialogue. I employ the history of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America, coupled with its “Social Statements” and “Messages,” to illustrate the 
ELCA’s commitment to honest deliberation, compromise and humility. 
 
VIII. Conclusion: A More Inclusive Public Square……………………...(43) 
 
I contend that a conventional understanding of religion, fueled by a political philosophy 
oriented around public reason, fails to comprehend the different roles that faith-based 
participants can play in the public realm of liberal democracies. Though some forms of 
religious organization (“faith-based advocacy organizations”) appear to make democratic 
deliberation difficult, others (“faith traditions”) have the ability to make positive 
contributions to discourse in the political sphere. Finally, I suggest that an overly simplistic 
understanding of religion fails to comprehend the significant theological and political 
changes that are taking place within the modern evangelical community, a phenomenon 
worth future study. 
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I. Introduction 
I guess this is just another lost cause, Mr. Paine. All you people don’t know about lost causes. 
Mr. Paine does. He said once they were the only causes worth fighting for. And he fought for 
them once, for the only reason any man ever fights for them. Because of just one plain, simple 
rule: “Love thy neighbor.” 
- Senator Jefferson Smith, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) 
The interaction between religion and politics remains contentious in liberal democracies. The 
meaningful role that religion plays in informing people’s lives is difficult to reconcile with the 
depth of religious diversity that exists in plural society. Indeed, for many the prospect of religion 
entering the public sphere evokes images of leaders who refuse to compromise regardless of the 
legitimate concerns of others.  
Concerns about religion’s involvement in the public sphere are particularly salient now. 
Some believe, rightly or wrongly, that actors in the current administration pursued policies based 
not upon a pragmatic evaluation of the international setting, but rather upon perceived divine 
mandates that admitted neither challenge nor compromise. Such concerns continue to play a role 
in the upcoming election as voters question the influence that a candidate’s religion will have on 
his or her decision-making as President. Though it appears that candidates are beginning to 
examine seriously the role that religion should play in the work of a democratically-elected 
official, uncertainty remains.  
Despite legitimate concerns about a fusion of religion and politics, there is something 
fundamentally problematic with the exclusion, whether coerced or self-imposed, of religious 
ideas from the public square. Religious individuals and organizations, like other actors within 
society, argue from potentially irreducible premises to conclusions with which many may 
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ultimately disagree. Just as other groups are accepted as legitimate contributors to the public 
dialogue despite the potentially exclusive and controversial nature of their claims, religious 
individuals and organizations should not be precluded from expressing their unique perspectives 
on the public good. 
I aim to go further than this, however. I mean to suggest that not only are religious 
institutions fully justified in participating in the democratic process, but also that they can make a 
positive contribution to a democratic society. More precisely, I intend to argue that certain types 
or manifestations of religion have a positive role to play within a democratic society. 
 First, I will engage the ongoing debate about whether religion should be kept strictly 
separate from politics. A strand of thought within democratic theory, grounded in “public 
reason,” contends that the assertion of “comprehensive doctrines” (including overarching 
religious and secular commitments) in public dialogue is antithetical to liberal democracy. In 
subsequent sections, I intend to not only question the strict notion of public reason that underlies 
this position, but also to maintain that it depends on a relatively monolithic picture of religion for 
its persuasive force. 
 Second, I intend to show that this monolithic picture of religion is problematic, and that 
specific forms or manifestations of religion can have a positive impact on a democratic society. I 
have no doubt that such a view will be seen as controversial, especially since liberal theory is 
quite properly reluctant to elevate some religions over others. By no means do I mean to suggest 
that some religions are somehow inherently superior to or more worthwhile than others; the 
distinctions that I draw will not be between the commitments or beliefs of different religious 
traditions, but rather between different ways that faith-based participants relate to their own 
traditions.  
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In making this argument, I will draw on a particular notion of a “tradition” as analyzed by 
thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre. I will argue that religious institutions have the capacity to 
contribute to democracy when they understand themselves as traditions and act accordingly. A 
tradition, as I defend it here, is a “historically extended, socially embodied argument” (MacIntyre 
1981, p.222) that has been perpetuated over time, and that provides the context for arguments 
made in the status quo. 1 For example, many of the arguments made by libertarians and socialists 
alike emerge from a liberal tradition, an ongoing discussion about the rights of individuals within 
society that presupposes particular conceptions about human beings and their relationship to 
government, and that is significantly affected by historical trends and developments.  
Traditions are significant because they can foster dialogue between their participants. 
Those participants, in turn, can see themselves as contributors to an ongoing discussion, and to a 
dialogic process that includes compromise and a willingness to engage with those who disagree 
with them. As a result, traditions have the capacity to foster important democratic habits and 
promote the peculiar virtues that vivify democratic society. In examining the nature and 
statements of religious groups, I argue that particular types of organized activity uniquely 
facilitate the types of traditions and practices that allow democracy to flourish. 
Through this theoretical lens, I argue that religious organizations and institutions have the 
capacity to make a positive contribution to a democracy. In order to make this argument, I draw 
upon a concept of “ideal types,” contrasting a form of religious organization that can be 
extremely dogmatic and uncompromising with “faith traditions” that need not be. I will ground 
these ideal types in reality by reference to an empirical example of each; I will use Focus on the 
Family as an example of an uncompromising religious organization, and the Evangelical 
                                                 
1
 See also MacIntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Ch. 17-19 for more in-depth analysis of 
MacIntyre’s view of traditions.  
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Lutheran Church in America as an example of a faith tradition. Naturally, neither of these 
examples will correspond perfectly to the ideal type with which it is fitted, as is practically 
always the case. However, I contend that their resemblance is sufficient to vindicate my 
argument against the easy conflation of religion with dogmatism. 
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II. The Idea of Public Reason 
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. 
- John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 137 
In order to assess the relationship between religion and politics, it is necessary to analyze 
and confront the popular notion of public reason. This idea continues to be influential within 
democratic theory, and has influenced society both in popular discourse and in constitutional 
case law. 
Even before John Rawls popularized the term “public reason” in 1993, a significant tenet 
of public reason, that any convergence between religion and the political sphere is dangerous to a 
democracy, manifested itself in the constitutional principle of “strict separation.” This principle 
held that the entanglement of religion with the public square breeds conflict and inhibit effective 
pluralism. Its influence (whether subtle or direct) on Supreme Court understandings of the 
Constitution’s religion clauses is evident, for instance, in Everson v. Board of Education, where 
dissenting justices argued that the devotion of public money to any religious purpose could 
“bring the struggle of sect against sect” (Lockhart 1976, p. 1212) and the opinion of the Court 
gave favorable reference to a “wall of separation between church and state” (Lockhart, p. 1212).   
The dominant philosophical underpinning for the argument that religiously-grounded 
advocacies do not belong in the public sphere gains considerable strength from John Rawls’s 
formulation of public reason. In his analysis of justice, Rawls reconciles the necessity of political 
discourse with the pluralism manifest in modern democratic society. On the one hand, 
deliberation is essential for the health of any democracy. In order for society to function 
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coherently, citizens with different viewpoints must deliberate. Simultaneously, however, it is 
evident that a great deal of diversity exists. It is not simply that people have varying conceptions 
of what policies or actions are most efficacious; society is also characterized by different 
conceptions of the goals themselves. That is, disagreement is thus not purely about means, a 
matter that could theoretically be resolved with sufficient empirical study or observation, but 
reaches as well to ends. Given this, Rawls suggests at least two problems. 
 First, he insists that disagreements are functionally incommensurable. No amount of 
public debate, he feels, could resolve the differences in first principles that people affirm. An 
atheist and a Hindu, for example, might not be able to adequately adjudicate between their two 
points of view no matter how long they were locked in a room together. Second, Rawls 
maintains that these disagreements in first principles generate disagreements on practical 
applications. That is, disagreements about the ends to which policy should be directed lead to 
fundamentally different and mutually exclusive policy positions (Rawls 1993, p. 56-7).  In such 
cases, compromise may be possible, but the compromise itself cannot be justified in terms of 
either set of first principles, and must, to a degree, abandon those principles.  
 Due to these difficulties, he insists that democratic discourse cannot function at the 
intersection of first principles. In order for a democracy to function, citizens excise their 
particular comprehensive doctrines from public debate, and instead engage their fellow citizens 
on grounds more favorable to general agreement. When arguing for policy, justifications should 
not be couched in divisive first principles; instead, such arguments must be grounded in what 
Rawls terms an “overlapping consensus” of the society (Rawls 1993, p. 137). 
 The implications for religious discourse are profound. Religious convictions, almost by 
necessity, are among the first principles or “comprehensive doctrines” that divide people. 
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Though it could legitimately be argued that there are common threads underlying many different 
religions, different religious traditions (to say nothing of those traditions that reject religion 
altogether) affirm very different understandings of the world and how human beings ought to act. 
In addition, Rawls argues, religious traditions are often unwilling to compromise (Rawls 1993, p. 
4; see also Rawls 1997, p. 781-3) Though religious groups will sometimes seek ecumenical 
dialogue, they may brook little to no negotiation on stances that they see as emerging directly out 
of their holy texts. Many arguing for a marriage amendment, for example, use specific biblical 
texts to argue for a policy stance about which they refuse negotiation. As a result, an approach 
like Rawls’s suggests that religious groups that refuse to ground their political argumentation in 
terms of public reason undermine the legitimacy of the democratic process by impeding effective 
discourse. 
 It is worthwhile to note that Rawls’s position appears to have changed slightly over time. 
In his earlier work he maintains that individuals and institutions should use exclusively public-
reason-based arguments within the public sphere. However, in his later essay “The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited,” he allows that religious institutions may be justified in supplying reasons 
based in their own comprehensive doctrine, so long as they are also willing and able to produce 
sufficient argumentation grounded in public reason (Rawls 1997, p. 776). For example, in his 
later writings Rawls would theoretically allow a religiously-based critique of the death penalty, 
but only if, for instance, this was accompanied by an argument that the death penalty has no 
deterrent effect. It is not clear, though, that this actually constitutes a substantive difference. If 
his argument remains that policies should not derive their persuasive power from the principles 
of a comprehensive doctrine, Rawls appears to accept religious arguments only if they are 
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superfluous, i.e. if they do not provide any additional persuasive force to the obligatory secular 
justification. 
 Robert Audi does not entirely agree with Rawls’s idea of public reason, but opts instead 
for an approach oriented around “secular reason.” Instead of the integrity of a democratic system, 
Audi argues from the principle of good democratic citizenship. Primarily, he contends that a 
democratic society is only justified in employing coercion when it can justify that coercion in 
terms that are at least minimally acceptable to the one being coerced (Audi, p. 65-7). If an 
agnostic wants to know why he is being sent to war, a government cannot justly answer that the 
war is being fought “for the glory of God in the name of Jesus Christ.”  Rather, the government 
must base its actions upon justifications that theists and atheists alike could accept, such as the 
basic security of the nation. Thus, for Audi, it is wrong for religious groups to argue for any form 
of coercive policy based on religious reasons because in doing so, they would not be good 
democratic citizens (Audi, p. 86-7). They would be seeking to coerce their fellow citizens for 
reasons that those citizens could not accept.  
Audi appears to follow Rawls in not completely excluding religious reasons, and even 
contends that religious reasons combined with secular reasons might legitimately enhance a 
policy’s persuasive appeal. However, this argument confronts the same problem as Rawls’s; if 
good democratic citizenship precludes the use of reasons that many rational citizens could not 
accept, it is difficult to see why it is acceptable for religiously-grounded reasons to be partially 
persuasive, but unacceptable for them to be wholly persuasive.  
We have seen that Rawlsian liberal philosophy insists that arguments in a liberal 
democracy must be grounded on public reasons rooted in an overlapping consensus of 
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comprehensive doctrines. What I will argue, however, is that this framework of public reason 
relies on a number of mistaken assumptions about the nature of comprehensive doctrines. 
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III. Criticisms of Public Reason 
Our agreement on some policy need not be based on some set of principles agreed on by all 
present and future citizens and rich enough to settle all important political issues. 
- Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (1997), p. 114 
The public reason-centered approach contends that democratic citizens must be able to 
justify their policy advocacy in terms of reasons that other citizens could accept irrespective of 
their philosophical or religious backgrounds. However, this approach has faced considerable 
criticism, due at least in part to its reliance on an unrealistic portrayal of the public sphere and of 
the comprehensive doctrines within it. Authors critical of public reason, such as Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, point out that public-reason-based liberal philosophy rests on one crucial premise: 
individuals in a democratic society can find a basis for argument that is independent of any one 
particular comprehensive doctrine or collection of comprehensive doctrines. However, 
Wolterstorff contends, this ideal is inconsistent with reality; arguments in the political sphere are 
continually (and necessarily) based on particular overarching premises (Audi and Wolterstorff 
1997, p. 162). 
 For instance, disagreements between liberal and conservative politicians regularly spring 
from differing theories of human nature (Greenawalt 1988, p. 174), which, while secular in 
origin and formulation, nevertheless rest on foundational assumptions to which not everyone 
would assent. For example, those advocating more expansive government programs will often 
defend them by reference to comparatively optimistic theories of human nature, while opponents 
of such programs will often derive much of their opposition from more realistic (as a technical, 
not pejorative term) understandings. Lacking any indisputable empirical proof to vindicate one 
understanding of human nature over its competitors (see, for instance, MacIntyre 1981, p. 88), 
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questions of basic human nature that have their roots in competing comprehensive doctrines will 
inevitably influence the positions citizens take in the public realm. Since neither side of the 
debate will be able to claim anything approaching a monopoly on rationality or rational 
supporters, the persistence of these competing human-nature-based premises seems inevitable 
even though this state of affairs clearly violates Rawls’s position. 
Similarly, the policy views of a staunch pacifist will often be informed by either a 
religiously-grounded view, as it is for many Quakers, or a philosophically-grounded view, as it 
could be for some Kantians, that we may never intentionally take a life. This places the advocate 
of public reason in a difficult position. It seems readily apparent that this pacifist should be able 
to justify her stances on particular policies with reference to his or her pacifist framework. 
However, this appears to violate the criterion of public reason because fully rational individuals 
can and often do reject pacifism as a compelling moral framework. According to Audi, a policy 
rooted in this framework would also be an unjustified form of coercion. However, it is not at all 
clear why this would be true, any more than the imposition of conservative or liberal economic 
policies, often grounded in hotly disputed assumptions about human nature, unjustifiably coerces 
those who disagree with those policies. Since there is no manifest ground for the existence of a 
true overlapping consensus, it is not clear why adherents to comprehensive doctrines (including 
religious ones) have an obligation as good democratic citizens to justify their political positions 
in terms of public reason rather than their own overarching frameworks. 
In addition, the philosophy of public reason hinges on the fear that including 
comprehensive doctrines in public discussion will generate intractable conflict and hinder 
effective dialogue. Absent these destructive tendencies, defenders of public reason are left with 
the problematic contention that citizens of a democratic society unjustifiably coerce or disrespect 
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one another if they advance arguments that other fully rational citizens could find objectionable. 
Correspondingly, advocates of public reason continually express concerns about the intrusion of 
comprehensive doctrines (or, from Audi’s perspective, specifically religious reasons) into public 
discourse. Audi, for instance, writes that: 
Where religious convictions are a basis of disagreement, it is, other things equal, 
less likely that the disputants will achieve resolution or even peacefully agree to 
disagree. If God’s will is felt to be clear, there is likely to seem only one way to 
view the issue. This can apply as much to prima facie non-religious problems 
such as health care as it does to specifically religious practices. (Audi, p. 69) 
 
He later elaborates on these fears, arguing that religious reasons tend to be characterized by 
(among other things) a sense of infallibility and a specter of religious domination (Audi, p. 100-
2). Though Audi seems to admit that religion is not necessarily this way (Audi, p. 100, 102), he 
seems to understand these particular pernicious characteristics as generally descriptive of 
religion. Likewise, Rawls contends that: 
The most intractable struggles, political liberalism assumes, are confessedly for 
the sake of the highest things: for religion, for philosophical views of the world, 
and for different moral conceptions of the good. We should find it remarkable 
that, so deeply opposed in these ways, just cooperation among free and equal 
citizens is possible at all. In fact, historical experience suggests that it rarely is. If 
the problem addressed is all too familiar, political liberalism proposes…a 
somewhat unfamiliar resolution of it. (Rawls 1993, p. 4) 
 
The resolution to which Rawls refers, of course, is his theory of political liberalism, which 
includes as a fundamental part the idea that arguments must derive from public reasons that have 
their origins in an overlapping consensus. This line of argument runs through much of the public 
reason tradition, and turns on the further claim that comprehensive doctrines are by their nature 
divisive, rigid and uncompromising.  
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 Many would suggest that this claim it is peculiarly ironic. For instance, McWilliams 
argues that liberal individualism can be just as divisive due to its tendencies to value the desires 
and integrity of the individual to the exclusion of a common good (McWilliams, p.150-1). 
Religion, he suggests, can actually promote the opposite, by encouraging individuals to 
participate in a good that transcends their immediate desires (McWilliams, p. 145-6).  
In addition, as I will later argue, the monolithic description of religious comprehensive 
doctrines is flawed because it disregards the multiplicity of forms that such doctrines can take. 
More precisely, it fails to recognize the existence of comprehensive doctrines that are open to 
respectful dialogue and ongoing deliberation. It is to that subject that I now turn. 
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IV. The Concept of a Tradition 
The individual’s search for his or her good is generally and characteristically conducted within 
a context defined by those traditions of which the individual’s life is a part. 
- Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981),  p. 222 
Rawls’s conception of an overlapping consensus grounded in public reason relies on the 
assumption that the inclusion of comprehensive doctrines in public debate on political issues will 
engender dogmatism and undermine the important political virtues of reasoned and respectful 
deliberation. In this section, I will argue that Rawls’s understanding is flawed because it fails to 
consider that a comprehensive doctrine’s argumentation within the public sphere can be anything 
but dogmatic and extremist.   
One philosopher who strongly criticizes the conflation of comprehensive doctrines with 
dogmatism and extremism is Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre defends a model of discourse that is 
distinct from the standard liberal conception. He refers to this model as a “tradition of enquiry,” 
or more simply, a “tradition.” A tradition, he argues, is an “historically extended, socially 
embodied argument” (MacIntyre 1981, p. 222) that has been perpetuated over time, and that 
provides the context for arguments made in the status quo. For example, the British common law 
embodies a hermeneutical tradition in which principles are developed over time and applied to 
particular cases, and particular cases in turn influence the evolution of overarching principles. To 
use another example, some argue that both Marxism and modern capitalism are to some degree 
rooted in the philosophy of John Locke, and as such, both are part of a “Lockean” tradition of 
inquiry (very roughly speaking). They both argue from assumptions derived from Locke’s views 
on the origin of property rights, although they draw different conclusions from those common 
premises.  
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This paper will employ MacIntyre’s conceptual framework of a tradition because it is 
useful to understand how comprehensive doctrines (particularly religious ones) function in 
society. Two caveats are worth noting, however. First, my use of MacIntyre’s conceptual 
framework does not mean that I endorse every attribute which MacIntyre ascribes either to 
particular traditions or to traditions as such. Instead, I aim to draw from those aspects of 
traditions that bear most directly and meaningfully upon the issue(s) in question. Second, and 
relatedly, I use the concept of a tradition as an ideal type, much as MacIntyre himself appears to 
do at times. The neat criteria assigned to the definition of a tradition rarely correspond perfectly 
to particular traditions, and they will certainly not correspond flawlessly to observed faith 
traditions.  Despite this imperfect correspondence, however, the category of a tradition is often a 
useful way to understand faith communities. 
A word on terminology is also important here. I will use the phrase “faith communities” 
or “faith traditions” interchangeably to refer to those forms of religious organization that 
correspond to a tradition as understood by Macintyre. As such, my use of these terms should not 
be taken to imply any particular meaning that sociological or theological inquiry may have 
ascribed to the terms.    
According to MacIntyre, traditions have a number of unique characteristics, three of 
which are particularly important for this paper. First, traditions are in some way self-sufficient; 
they contain various assumptions internal to them that drive the conclusions they reach. This will 
have important implications for inter-tradition discourse because it means that dialogue across 
traditions is often difficult, and those operating within different traditions often embrace 
incommensurable premises. Second, despite the difficulty of inter-tradition dialogue, distinct 
traditions have some capacity, though limited, to engage one another. Although there is not, per 
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se, a common framework to which both traditions can appeal for adjudication, traditions can still 
criticize and complement one another. One tradition can criticize another by pointing out that its 
opponent’s premises create significant problems that only its alternative framework can both 
identify and solve. MacIntyre believes, for example, that Aristotelian philosophy can be shown 
to be superior to its Enlightenment counterpart by virtue of its ability to identify and correct what 
MacIntyre sees as incoherence in the Enlightenment accounts of morality.2 Through this 
interaction, traditions have the ability, to the extent that it is possible, to alter their claims in a 
way that resolves internal problems. MacIntyre explains: 
A second stage [of controversy between traditions] is reached if and when the 
protagonists of each tradition, having considered in what ways their own tradition 
has by its own standards of achievement in enquiry found it difficult to develop its 
enquiries beyond a certain point, or has produced in some areas insoluble 
antinomies, ask whether the alternative and rival tradition might not be able to 
provide resources to characterize and to explain the defects and failings of their 
own tradition than they, using the resources of that tradition, have been able to do. 
(MacIntyre 1988, p. 166-7) 
 
Thus, MacIntyre argues that traditions can, at least to some extent, engage other traditions in an 
ongoing quest for truth.  
In addition to the self-sufficiency and limited capacity for mutual engagement that 
characterizes traditions, traditions possess a third attribute that is especially important for this 
thesis. A tradition involves an ongoing hermeneutical dialogue within itself through which its 
ideas are improved and clarified as internal problems are detected and resolved. Individuals do 
not simply presuppose that the broad principles they defend provide immediately-evident 
                                                 
2
 MacIntyre also argues that two different traditions can sometimes join into one larger tradition, as he believes 
happened with the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions through the work of Thomas Aquinas (see MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 166. 
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answers for particular problems or questions in the real world.3 Instead, participants within a 
tradition engage in an ongoing constructive dialogue debating how the multiplicity of 
overarching principles within the tradition are to be applied in particular cases that the tradition 
confronts.  
The aforementioned Lockean tradition, or more precisely, the British tradition the 
tensions of which are captured in Locke, is a perfect example. A great deal of debate takes place 
within this tradition between its free-market and socialist wings, both of which claim to be heirs 
to the British tradition with which Locke identifies himself. In his Second Treatise, Locke 
contends that individual property rights are contingent on leaving “enough, and as good” for 
others (Locke, p. 112). Different schools of thought have employed this caveat to justify both 
extensive government intervention into the economy and a minimalist form of government. For 
instance, both John Rawls and Robert Nozick arguably employ a modified Lockean framework 
to justify their own philosophical positions.4 Rawls utilizes Locke’s limitations on the right to 
property to justify substantial governmental action on the grounds that government must secure 
equal opportunity for all individuals in society. He contends that this equal opportunity is 
frequently lacking due to a lottery of birth which endows some with greater resources than 
others, and therefore Rawls defends substantial government action to level the playing field 
(Rawls 1971, p. 72-3). In contrast, Nozick uses the very same principles to argue that the 
government should only interfere with individual decisions if they actively deprive someone of 
                                                 
3
 This is not to be confused with the distinction, which some traditions reject, between practical reasons and actual 
actions. As MacIntyre (1988) points out, at least some traditions have suggested that when one has identified both 
what the good is and what promotes the good in one’s particular situation, that one can immediately discern the 
correct course of action without any further questions (18-9). This is distinct from the argument I am making here, 
namely that a tradition does not presuppose that its overarching premises self-evidently entail one particular 
course of action. 
4
 The characterization that follow will, admittedly, not take full stock of the nuance within both Rawls’ and Nozick’s 
philosophical system, but serves nonetheless to illustrate the connection of two very different philosophical 
arguments to one particular tradition of thought which MacIntyre himself identifies as “liberal” (see MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice?, p. 345).  
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resources without that individual’s consent. (Nozick 1974, p. 175-82). Both philosophers draw 
from a common tradition, but they form very different conclusions about what that tradition 
entails for a good society. 
MacIntyre himself uses the example of Thomist philosophy. This philosophical tradition 
admits that there are no categorical rules for ascertaining the “relevance of the precepts of natural 
law to any particular situation” (MacIntyre 1988, p. 195). Despite the presence of overarching 
principles which Aquinas believed to be virtually infallible, there remains a significant role for 
intra-tradition dialogue. As Aquinas (quoted by MacIntyre) puts it: 
Since discourse on moral matters even in their universal aspects is subject to 
uncertainty and variation, it is all the more uncertain if one wishes to descend to 
bringing doctrine to bear on individual cases in specific detail, for this cannot be 
dealt with by either art or precedent, because the factors in individual cases are 
indeterminately variable. Therefore, judgment concerning individual cases must 
be left to the prudentia of each person… (MacIntyre 1988, 196)5 
 
Both of these examples illustrate a distinction between the overarching principles that are 
fundamental to a tradition and the particular applications of those principles in the world. As 
such, the diverse principles that a tradition affirms facilitate dialogue in two ways. First, ongoing 
debate exists as to how any given principle can best be applied within the constraints of the real 
world. If a religious tradition believes that God commands human beings to be “good stewards of 
the Earth,” there can still be meaningful debate and dialogue as to what specific kinds of action 
would accomplish this overarching goal. 
This ongoing debate can be particularly significant within a faith tradition, since many 
faith traditions may have independent theological justifications for this dialogue. Faith traditions 
often argue, for instance, that the perfect will of God cannot be flawlessly embedded in a world 
                                                 
5
 Aquinas appears to hold a curiously individualistic conception of inquiry in this excerpt. However, MacIntyre’s 
later analysis suggests that Aquinas still defends an ethic centered around a discursive community, as MacIntyre 
illustrates on p. 197. 
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of fallible and corruptible human beings. Instead, they suggest, the overarching divine 
commands may serve a dialogic function with the world. They stand both as perfect principles 
that can be adapted to the world only in limited ways, and as ideals that judge our finite systems 
of morality and push us to a more moral and just order.6   
Second, the multiplicity of principles within a tradition forces adherents to balance 
potentially conflicting claims. Suppose that the aforementioned religious tradition, in addition to 
its expectation of good stewardship, also commands its followers to “love their neighbor.” If 
adherents face a situation where protecting the environment (“the Earth”) may somehow require 
impeding the development of an agricultural society, participants within the tradition must 
engage in constructive dialogue to adjudicate the conflict.  
It is important to emphasize that the virtue of constructive dialogue is itself embedded 
within the very notion of a tradition. Participants thus internalize the value of positive dialogue, 
and (particularly in the case of many faith traditions) may justify this norm of dialogue from 
within the tradition itself. As Macintyre writes: 
The concept of rational justification which is at home in that form of enquiry is 
essentially historical. To justify is to narrate how the argument has gone so far. 
Those who construct theories within such a tradition of enquiry and justification 
often provide those theories with a structure in terms of which certain of these 
have the status of first principles; other claims within such a theory will be 
justified by derivation from these first principles. But what justifies the first 
principles themselves, or rather the whole structure of theory of which they are a 
part, is the rational superiority of that particular structure to all previous attempts 
within that particular tradition to formulate such theories and principles. 
(MacIntyre 1988, p.8) 
 
Because the character of tradition-oriented discussion involves an ongoing process, participants 
within an authentic tradition derive their positions through critical engagements with one 
another. 
                                                 
6
 See, for instance, the philosophical and theological analysis of Reinhold Niebuhr, who orients a significant 
amount of his analysis around a dynamic relationship between perfect divine love and its fallible earthly imitations. 
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In his discussion of traditions, MacIntyre also discusses the idea of a “practice.” A 
practice, according to him, is any kind of “coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity” (MacIntyre 1981, p. 187). It is focused, according to MacIntyre, on 
goods that are internal rather than external to the activity. In contrast with “external” goods (such 
as money, power or fame) that may or may not be gained from the activity, “internal” goods are 
those that can only be achieved through active participation. Politics, I will argue, is such a 
practice. Within a democratic society, the political sphere is a domain in which dialogue occurs. 
As a result, participation in the political sphere has the capacity to promote the “internal” goods 
(such as compromise and a willingness to at least see the positions of one’s opponents as 
legitimate) that are essential to meaningful dialogue. Though it is evident that politics is far from 
a perfect forum of dialogue, it nonetheless serves that function to a significant degree.  
 Politics, however, is not simply a forum in which intra-traditional discussions take place. 
Rather, I mean to suggest that politics is a forum in which differing traditions, in their entirety, 
can engage with one another and partake in the dialogic virtues. As such, religious traditions are 
fully justified in putting their opinions into the public square as they are, without being obligated 
to couch their positions in terms of liberal theory. Rawls explicitly rejects this position, arguing 
that in the political sphere, individuals should eschew discussion of excessively divisive issues in 
favor of a common ground based in public reason. (Rawls 1993, p. 204). 
When religious traditions willingly engage in the public sphere without being bound by 
the strictures of public reason, both the religious traditions and the dialogue benefit. Religious 
traditions benefit because they must reconcile two very distinct and often interacting roles that 
religious groups play. Religious organizations often have a vested interest in appealing to 
“secular reasons” for policies with which they would agree. Catholic groups arguing against 
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particular immigration policies, for example, will often gain more traction citing statistics and 
referencing the United States’ own ideals than simply quoting the Bible. In doing so, they 
criticize current applications of a liberal tradition based on the basic principles of that tradition.  
At the same time, however, they also perceive an obligation to play what is referred to as 
a prophetic role over and against the current establishment.  During the Civil Rights Movement, 
for example, King’s appeal was not based solely on pointing out incoherencies within the 
contemporary application of liberal principles. In addition to his use of liberal principles, he 
utilized his theologically-grounded appeal to justice and love for one’s neighbor to call the state 
to account (Sturm 316).  Similarly, many religious groups advocate concern for the poor on the 
basis that human societies are obligated to protect the “least among them.” In doing so, they 
understand themselves to be fulfilling a divine mandate to challenge the state when it acts 
unjustly (towards either its own citizens or to people in other countries).  This dual role of 
persuading from the inside and critiquing from the outside can often be an outgrowth of the 
dialogic nature of divine commandments. 
 However, religious institutions are not the only entities that benefit from the inclusion of 
religiously-grounded positions in political dialogue. The political sphere benefits as well. The 
diversity of input offered by the “prophetic” role that religious groups can play not only provides 
for a richer marketplace of ideas, but can also serve as a check on the excesses of the state (as the 
previous King example illustrates). Additionally, and where the empirical dimension of this 
thesis will be concentrated, the inclusion of religious voices in the political sphere can have a 
moderating influence. One aspect of this is that the willing inclusion of religious voices can 
moderate extremist religious rhetoric by fostering a sense of inclusion within the political 
process. When groups feel that they are excluded from the democratic process, they often 
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become radicalized and feel less of an incentive to abide fully by democratic norms of civility 
and deliberation. In the latter half of the 20th century, when many religious groups felt 
marginalized and excluded from the democratic process, they rallied behind groups such as the 
Christian Coalition whose specific policy aims were explicitly articulated in biblical terms, and 
whose rhetoric tended to demonize those who opposed them (Capps, 185-217). As such, the free 
incorporation of religiously-grounded advocacies in the public sphere may give religious 
institutions a greater perceived stake in the system. 
 More fundamentally, though, the incorporation of religious traditions into the public 
sphere could improve a democratic society by embedding religiously-inspired argumentation 
within a proper context.  As I will later argue in more detail, the arguments supplied by faith-
based advocacy organizations select particular principles embedded within faith traditions and 
contend that those principles require one specific, indisputable policy stance. For instance, many 
faith-based groups have taken specific verses that they see as condemning homosexuality out of 
a broader Christian tradition, and on the basis of those specific verses, demand that a state must 
ban gay marriage in order to possess any kind of moral legitimacy. In doing so, they reason in a 
way that is directly contrary to the way a tradition would; they both elevate one single principle 
over all others, and insist that this principle has indisputable policy outcomes. 
 These groups stand in sharp contrast with many mainline religious organizations 
grounded in faith traditions that have evolved and have functioned in the political sphere for 
some time. Rather than embrace positions that are both uncompromising and rooted solely in 
references to their own scripture, mainline Protestant and Catholic groups tend to balance 
argumentation grounded in “public reason” with analysis derived primarily from their own 
scriptural foundations. As such, they are able to fulfill their prophetic role without compromising 
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the ability to conduct public discourse. They maintain the capability to accept a wide range of 
positions, and encourage a process of deliberation. 
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V. A Tale of Two Religious Forms 
The best contribution of religion is precisely not to be ideologically predictable nor loyally 
partisan. 
- Jim Wallis, God’s Politics (2005), p. xviii 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of a tradition provides a model of a comprehensive doctrine 
that would reject the dogmatism that advocates of public reason fear. What the next two sections 
will illustrate, however, is that the concept of a religious tradition is not a hypothetical one. A 
great deal of my analysis to demonstrate this comes from the online public statements that my 
two “case study” organizations have made. Through these statements, they represent themselves 
to public audiences. My attention to these statements is due in large part to my interest in how 
these organizations would function as democratic citizens talking to the public. 
 In order to make this argument, I distinguish “faith-based advocacy organizations” from 
“faith traditions.” Though the term “faith tradition” certainly exists both in philosophy and in 
common usage,7 the distinction between a “faith tradition” as I define it and a “faith-based 
advocacy organization” is not, as far as I can tell, currently made in the literature, or at least not 
in political philosophy. But I believe that it is extremely important. These two forms, or “ideal 
types,” of organization, represent two very different ways of interpreting religious principles and 
applying them to the world. Having made the distinction between these two “ideal types,” I will 
discuss an individual case study of each to illustrate how these ideal types are embodied in the 
world.  In these “case studies,” I will discuss three primary issues that each of the two 
institutions confronts. I will analyze each organization’s response to abortion, homosexuality and 
                                                 
7
 Stanley Hauerwas, for instance, argues for a Christian ethic grounded in the idea of tradition rather than a liberal 
philosophy. See, for instance, Hauerwas, Stanley and Charles Pinches (1997). Christians Among the Virtues. Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
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poverty, and based on the very different positions that the two institutions take on these issues, I 
argue that they constitute meaningfully distinct forms of religious association. 
A faith-based advocacy organization is a group of individuals formed almost exclusively 
around a common political ideology. In keeping with the name, a faith-based advocacy 
organization exists to advocate for specific kinds of policy measures.  It devotes exclusive 
attention to select issues drawn from a range of theologically-grounded alternatives, and as a 
result, elevates a small subset of issues into controversies. When it advocates for these policies, it 
is likely to be dogmatic, perhaps at least in part because disagreement is not built into its 
structure. My central contention is that faith-based advocacy groups uproot policy positions from 
the faith traditions in which they have been embedded. In so doing they gain dogmatic certainty 
at the expense of ignoring the hermeneutical context from which their policy agenda has been 
wrenched. 
To illustrate the concept of a faith-based advocacy organization, I will provide analysis of 
a group known as Focus on the Family.  It has been fairly influential on the national scene and at 
times has featured prominently in the ongoing presidential election process. I will argue that 
Focus on the Family, as a fair (albeit imperfect) representation of a faith-based advocacy 
organization, represents the kind of religious involvement in the public sphere that advocates of 
public reason are legitimately concerned about. 
A faith tradition, on the other hand, would be the religious instantiation of a MacIntyrean 
tradition. In contrast with a faith-based advocacy organization, members of a faith tradition 
would come together and associate with one another based upon a broad common set of 
foundational theological beliefs. Like the common law principles, these foundational beliefs are 
at one and the same time the arbiters of specific cases and themselves subtly reshaped by the 
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cases they are arbitrating. Disagreement about the meaning and application of principles would 
exist, but it would be regarded as wholly acceptable. This is partly because the tradition doesn’t 
want to be torn apart. But a faith tradition may find theological grounds for encouraging open 
and honest deliberation about issues that they admit are difficult and controversial, just as the 
common law tradition finds legal grounds for accepting, indeed encouraging, adversarial 
exchange over common law rules and their application. Due to its practically- and theologically-
grounded norms of deliberation, such a tradition could certainly be a positive influence on 
political discourse. 
To represent the concept of a faith tradition, I have chosen to analyze the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America. I will combine evidence from its past actions and current 
statements to argue that the ELCA represents a community where respectful dialogue is actively 
encouraged, and as a result, calls upon its members to advocate for causes which advance 
principles that the ELCA understands as fundamental. It makes no presumption as to what 
particular policy positions that those principles entail but rather encourages its members to enter 
into respectful dialogue as to what those policies might be. 
If the ELCA truly does represent the “ideal type” of a faith tradition, it follows that the 
theory of public reason is based on an unwarranted generalization regarding comprehensive 
doctrines. This is the contribution that I offer to the literature: I maintain that because faith 
traditions like the ELCA represent a form of comprehensive religious doctrine that does not give 
rise to the dogmatism that advocates of public reason fear, arguments made from these traditions 
should be treated as completely acceptable in political dialogue. 
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Table 1.1: Faith Traditions and Faith-Based Advocacy Organizations 
Faith Tradition: Faith-Based Advocacy Organization: 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America Focus on the Family 
Overarching 
Approach: 
Dialogic approach that recognizes the possible 
tensions between overarching principles and 
the diversity of ways in which principles could 
be applied to policy questions 
Faith-based policies taken from inflexible 
rules without evaluating them in the 
context of relevant overarching principles 
Social Action 
"This church shall…be a community where 
open, passionate, and respectful deliberation 
on challenging and controversial issues of 
contemporary society is expected and 
encouraged;…address through deliberative 
processes the issues faced by the people of 
God in order to equip them in their 
discipleship and citizenship in the world." 
("Church and Society") 
"If we capture and embrace more of God’s 
worldview and trust it with unwavering 
faith, then we begin to make the right 
decisions and form the appropriate 
responses to questions on abortion, same- 
sex marriage, cloning, stem-cell research 
and even media choices." (emphasis 
mine)(Tackett 2008) 
Abortion 
"This church encourages its members to 
participate in the public debate on abortion in 
a spirit of respect for those with whom they 
differ. Committed to a process of raising and 
deliberating the difficult and unresolved 
questions, this church encourages its 
members, informed by faith understandings 
and by their conscience, to decide and act on 
this issue in ways that are responsive to God 
and to the needs of the neighbor." 
("Abortion") 
"For those who wish to consider a faith 
perspective in their abortion position, the 
sanctity and value of preborn human life is 
affirmed in the Holy Bible." (Earll 2008a) 
Homosexual 
Marriage 
On some matters of sexuality, there are strong 
and continuing differences among us...  We 
pray for the grace to avoid unfair judgment of 
those with whom we differ, the patience to 
listen to those with whom we disagree, and the 
love to reach out to those from whom we may 
be divided." ("Sexuality") 
"This public meaning of marriage is not 
something that each new generation is free 
to redefine. Marriage is defined by the God 
of nature and nature’s God—and a wise 
society will protect marriage as it has 
always been understood." (Stanton 2008) 
Poverty and 
Homelessness 
"The Gospel does not provide ready-made 
solutions to homelessness. God's love in Jesus 
Christ does, however, move us to care for 
homeless people as God cares for all...While 
as Christians we may differ in our views on 
what policies will be most effective, we ought 
not overlook the need for new and sustained 
initiatives by government, businesses, and 
non-profit organizations, including church 
groups. " ("Homelessness") 
No real mention, except for the following: 
"When it comes to preventing poverty, 
social science research clearly shows that 
an intact, two-parent home is a strong 
predictor of who will escape poverty." 
(Minnery 2008) 
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VI. Faith-Based Advocacy Organization: Focus on the Family 
Did you know that the Bible takes a very clear position on capital gains tax? It takes a very clear 
position on income tax. The Bible takes a clear position on the estate tax, and takes a position on 
minimum wage. All these are economic issues we should be able to shape citizens’ thinking on 
because of what the Bible says. 
- Dan Barton, 2004 
Focus on the Family was founded in 1977 by an evangelical psychologist named James 
Dobson to counter what he perceived as dangerously permissive tendencies within American 
culture (Buss, p. 67-8, cited in Gilgoff, p. 24). Dobson initially envisioned Focus as an 
organization that could provide theologically conservative advice to families that sought it, and 
as a result, anchored the group’s resources around a radio program to promote his views of the 
family and to provide people with an alternative to the liberal paradigm he perceived as 
dominant in the psychological establishment (Gilgoff, p. 7-8; see also Buss, p. 79). 
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Dobson grew dissatisfied with the direction of 
American politics. From his perspective, predecessor organizations such as Christian Coalition 
and Moral Majority had both grown too attached to the Republican Party. As a result, the 
Republicans had taken them for granted and saw little need to give serious attention to their 
demands. In a series of speeches both before groups of Congressmen and in other forums, 
Dobson harshly criticized both for making compromises at the expense of what he saw as a 
fundamental conservative agenda (Gilgoff, p. 108-9).  
In the late1980s, as Tim Stafford points out in Christianity Today, Dobson gradually 
began shifting Focus’s resources into the political sphere, though a majority of the organization’s 
money and personnel would remain in the radio show (as cited in Gilgoff, 2007, p. 30). This may 
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have helped both his organization’s effectiveness and the perception of his viewers that he was 
not owned by any politician or party.  Initially, he did not endorse any particular political 
candidates, but rather put pressure on politicians (primarily Republicans) to embrace his desired 
agenda (banning abortion and rolling back gay rights). He asked churches to support 
conservative candidates and in so doing attached religion to his conservatism (Gilgoff, p. 14-5). 
To those who began to argue that Focus was becoming too political, and in doing so was 
abandoning its mission of helping families, Dobson argued that the culture itself was a source of 
many of the problems people experienced. Political advocacy was thus an extension of Focus’ 
mission, he contended, because cultural and political issues were to an extent intertwined 
(Gilgoff, p. 36-7). In 1988 Focus on the Family established state-level Family Policy Councils to 
lobby state legislatures for favorable legislation (Diamond, p. 34, cited in Gilgoff, p. 32). 
In 2003, Dobson stepped down from the chairmanship of Focus, though he remains 
president. While he no longer has the same leadership role that he possessed before, his specific 
ideology has been effectively inscribed upon the organization (Buss, p. 325-6, cited in Gilgoff, p. 
65). Dobson himself has served a dual role: he is the founder of Focus and thus closely 
connected to it, but to an extent acts as a free agent (Gilgoff, p. 64-5). When proposals for a 
Federal Marriage Amendment surfaced in 2004, Dobson referred to it as his “D-Day,” indicating 
that he perceived its passage as a pivotal and essential victory. Accordingly, he devoted 
substantial political capital to ensure its support (Gilgoff, p. 140). Though there was initial 
hostility on the issue between Family Research Council president Connor (who opposed the 
amendment due to concerns about its practicality) and Dobson, the issue ended when Connor 
resigned and Dobson replaced him with the far more Amendment-friendly Tony Perkins 
(Gilgoff, p. 155). 
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Focus on the Family is an organization focused primarily on providing advice to 
individuals and families, but it also exerts energy defending and promoting particular agendas 
that it sees as fundamental to its religious mission. These agendas are grouped into issue areas, 
which generally appear to have three components: advice for parents or relevant family 
members, Biblical quotations on the issue, and a policy analysis that adopts a particular stance. 
Though its official policy statements employ primarily secular (understood as “adhering to the 
standard of public reason”) argumentation, many of the adjoined articles on the issue area will 
cite specific biblical texts whose meaning and policy implications are seen as relatively 
unambiguous. 
 It is worth noting that Focus’ official policy statements deal almost exclusively with 
specific policies. Unlike the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (as will be explored in 
more detail later),  Focus on the Family does not make any sustained analysis of its role in the 
broader society, except as a theme interwoven throughout its analyses that individual adherents 
need to advocate what is understood to be an explicit and incontrovertible Biblical morality. To 
illustrate Focus’ approach, I have chosen to examine statements that the organization has issued 
on three particular issue areas: abortion, homosexual marriage, and poverty. These will later be 
contrasted with the ELCA’s analyses on these issues, as they are visually in Table 1.1. 
 Focus’s analysis on abortion is an example of its overall approach to social questions. Its 
article “What the Bible says about the Beginning of Life” lays out what is understood to be a 
clear, decisive case for the full and equal presence of the fetus within the human moral 
community. Numerous verses are said to speak to this presence, and are drawn from various 
parts of the Hebrew and Greek Bible. The article also seeks to confront specific questions of 
whether there can be incest or rape exceptions, or whether fetuses with disabilities can justifiably 
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be aborted. In each case, one or two verses are used to support definitive answers to these 
questions, employing one specific Biblically-related principle which is argued to lead to a 
dogmatic policy conclusion. For instance, one of the questions Focus’s website asks is: “Are the 
preborn human beings?” In response, they cite a pair of verses from Luke, one of which states: 
“When Elizabeth heard Mary’s greeting, the baby leaped in her womb, and Elizabeth was filled 
with the Holy Spirit… [saying] ‘As soon as the sound of your greeting reached my ears, the baby 
in my womb leaped for joy'" (Luke 1:41, 44, NIV)” (Earll 2008a). Significantly, these two verses 
are never really placed in a broader context of a Christian faith tradition, implying that the 
ongoing discourse within these faith communities is essentially superfluous. 
In another article, “What’s the Debate About?” two important considerations stand out. 
First, the article examines one specific dimension of the debate: the moral status of the fetus. The 
difficult nature of the situation and the practical questions accompanying any policy issue are not 
given consideration. Second, though the article appears to acknowledge that disagreement exists, 
it does not admit any particular legitimacy to those views that disagree with its own. In essence, 
Focus on the Family’s position effectively dismisses debate both on whether the verses in 
question can really be understood to imply that the fetus is a person, and on what that means for 
the laws that a society should embrace. There is, indeed, no debate to be had about a government 
policy which “exclude[s] small, vulnerable, defenseless, and dependent unborn human beings 
from its protection for no other reason than because others consider the unborn's destruction vital 
to their well-being” (Beckwith 2008) Similarly, as indicated in Table 1.1, the article “What’s 
Wrong with Abortion” declares that the only legitimate “faith-based” perspective is pro-life 
(both morally and legally) (Earll 2008b). This form of argument not only disagrees with, but in 
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fact denies any legitimacy to, a position that abortion should be made (as many have argued) 
“safe, rare and legal.”  
 This approach is even more manifest with regard to questions on homosexuality. From 
Focus’s considerable work on behalf of the Marriage Amendment, it is not particularly surprising 
that they argue for a clear inconsistency between Christianity and homosexuality. What is 
interesting about this issue is that unlike their analysis on abortion, Focus on the Family’s 
opinion pieces on homosexuality are strongly rooted in Biblical texts. For instance, they cite 
commands from Leviticus that “thou shalt not lie with a man as with a woman,” and some verses 
from Paul that have been argued to convey the same message (Dallas, 2008). In doing so, 
however, the organization virtually ignores the debate that takes place regarding the significance 
of these verses in the overall tradition. They devote a great deal of energy to criticizing what they 
refer to as “pro-gay theology,” and contend (as referenced in Table 1.1.) that “To confront the 
pro-gay theology, then, is to confront a deceptive element of our time -- the tendency to 
subjugate objective truth to subjective experience.” (Dallas, 2008) By demonizing “pro-gay 
theology,” and thereby refusing to consider it as a legitimate position in an ongoing dialogue, 
Focus again manifests its unwillingness to engage in the form of deliberative discourse that a 
democracy requires. 
 Focus’s analysis on poverty is most conspicuous in its absence. At no point on its website 
or external analysis does the organization appear to give significant attention to questions of 
poverty. This appears to be due to the organization’s focus around what it perceives as 
fundamental family-oriented questions that the United States is currently confronting. Its analysis 
centers on a particular set of issues and raises those issues to a high level of importance. Indeed, 
the one statement that makes slight efforts to address the issue of poverty argues that the family 
Religion and the Political Sphere 36 
 
values defended by Focus are a prerequisite for the elimination of poverty (Minnery, 2008). As 
such, poverty is engaged as an ancillary injury to poor family values rather than as a situation 
containing separate issues with which to engage. In this too, they expose their dissonance with 
the robust idea of tradition. Focus on the Family places their understanding of family values on a 
pedestal, and contends that other moral and social questions matter only insofar as they affect the 
family. In doing so, they neglect both the central concern for the poor within the Christian 
tradition and the numerous ways that poverty can influence the ability of a family to remain 
durable. By focusing exclusively on family values, rather than locating those values in the 
context of a tradition that examines the complex relationships between them, Focus exposes its 
preoccupation with a narrow, exclusive set of issues with regard to which deliberation and 
compromise are generally not welcome.  
While this criticism more or less implies that Focus on the Family functions as an interest 
group where political deliberation is concerned, I want to make my meaning plain. I do not mean 
to suggest, by any means, that Focus’ advocacy of particular issues renders it a poor contributor 
to democratic dialogue. Many individuals and organizations argue passionately in the political 
sphere for positions that they find important, and quite rightly so. They often bring to the table 
ideas and approaches that might not otherwise have entered discussion.  What is problematic 
about Focus on the Family is the narrowness and inflexibility that characterize the positions it 
espouses.  
 Indeed, what is striking about Focus’s statements, particularly the statement on 
homosexuality, is the tone by which the statements are communicated. Though they do not tend 
to use the explicit metaphors of combat and defeating an enemy that Jerry Falwell’s Moral 
Majority would often employ (Capps 1990, p. 30-1), they often impute malicious or 
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conspiratorial motives to those that disagree with them. At the very least, they certainly refuse to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of those whose viewpoints differ from their own, and as a result, 
refuse to enter into honest deliberation with them. Though they appear to draw some of their 
theological resources from a rich Calvinist tradition (Capps, p. 60; Speer, p. 40), their positions 
remain uncompromising both in their essentials and in their specific applications. In short, the 
form that Focus on the Family’s advocacy tends to take is precisely that about which Rawls and 
Audi express legitimate concern: narrow, dogmatic claims which admit of no legitimate 
disagreement, and which, by demonizing their opposition, make it difficult for those who 
disagree with them to regard the policies motivated by their beliefs as acceptable. 
 Moreover, Focus on the Family is a problem case for Rawls and Audi. Though biblical 
arguments abound and are undoubtedly the primary underpinning for Focus’s positions, the 
organization also seeks to make arguments based on what they believe to be shared human moral 
intuitions (as they do, for instance, in the case of abortion). Because these appear to represent an 
appeal that both meets the standards of public reason and is fairly dogmatic, Rawls’s conflation 
of public reason with moderation and comprehensive doctrines with dogmatism appears very 
much misplaced. 
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VII. Faith Tradition: Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 
Because of the diversity in Scripture, and because of the contemporary world's distance from the 
biblical world, it is necessary to scrutinize the texts carefully in their own setting and to interpret 
them faithfully in the context of today. In their witness to God's Word, the ecumenical creeds and 
the Lutheran confessions guide this church's approach to Scripture, and the church's history and 
traditions instruct it in its deliberation. 
- Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Social Statement on Church and Society 
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, like all Lutheran denominations, derives a 
great deal of its inspiration from the works of a 14th century monk named Martin Luther. Luther 
strongly criticized contemporary policies of the Catholic Church that he perceived as antithetical 
to biblical Christianity. He believed that the Catholic tradition had been corrupted over time and 
initially aimed to reform the Church from within. When his efforts failed, he and those who 
supported him broke away from the Catholic Church entirely and formed what is now loosely 
referred to as Protestantism. The Lutheran church in particular is so named because it not only 
understands itself as separate from the Catholic tradition, but also gives great significance to 
Luther’s theological understanding of Christianity. 
The American Lutheran community in particular originated primarily from immigrant 
populations. Groups of individuals along the Rhine River established Lutheran communities 
within the colonies (later states), oriented primarily around shared ethnic and geographical 
identities (Gilbert, p. 1-9). As these communities integrated themselves into a broader American 
identity, many Lutheran congregations congealed into larger, more diverse entities. Over time, 
many of these entities grew to transcend any particular ethnic or geographical affiliation. 
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 From this process, a number of larger church bodies formed. Some of them remained 
independent, such as the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and the Wisconsin Evangelical 
Lutheran Synod. However, three of these large organizations would eventually coalesce into the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. The American Lutheran Church, based in Minnesota, 
was a fairly conservative organization that placed great emphasis on individual piety. In contrast, 
the Lutheran Church in America was theologically liberal and relatively centralized. The third 
body, the Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches, was a more moderate body that broke 
off from the more conservative Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. After a substantial amount of 
dialogue, the three aforementioned organizations came together to form the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America in 1988 (Gilbert, p. 67-9). 
 As a general principle, the ELCA has incorporated reasoned dialogue into its processes of 
deliberation, due at least in part to its theology of “Two Kingdoms,” and of human sinfulness. 
The “kingdom of the right,” or “City of God” in the terminology of Augustine, is what the 
church aspires to become, a perfect reflection of Jesus’s commandments. At the same time, the 
church recognizes that it will always fall short of this ideal. The “kingdom of the left,” or “City 
of Man,” in contrast, is the larger society in which the church resides (Braaten, 132). The ELCA, 
along with prominent theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr,8 contend that the principles 
embedded within the Gospel texts (such as “turn the other cheek”) cannot be perfectly applied to 
any human institutions (including the church). This is true both because society relies upon the 
law to maintain some level of order in society, and because imperfect human beings are 
incapable of instituting a perfect order. As such, they argue, it will instead be necessary to accept 
                                                 
8
 It is worth noting here that Niebuhr was known for objecting vociferously to Luther’s Two Kingdoms idea, 
because he felt that it isolated the church too much from the world and detached it too significantly from its 
broader obligations to humanity. (Gritsch and Jenson, p. 179) 
Religion and the Political Sphere 40 
 
limited, partial substitutes. 9 Because basic Biblical mandates such as a love for one’s neighbor 
and a concern for the poor cannot be perfectly realized in any specific policy, Lutheran theology 
promotes an emphasis on deliberation to find the means by which these mandates can best be 
fulfilled in the world.  
Moreover, precisely because of the enduring moral and intellectual fallibility of human 
beings, the idea of the Two Kingdoms encourages a sense of humility. It cautions against any 
one individual’s pretensions that he or she possesses the full truth on an issue, and thus 
encourages people who embrace it to pursue open and respectful dialogue with those who 
disagree with them rather than assuming that their opponents must be either intellectually or 
morally deficient.   
 This theological mandate appears to play a significant role in influencing the ELCA’s 
approach to social issues. Though it does not refrain from taking particular positions on some 
issues, it commits itself to an ongoing process of respectful dialogue between those of different 
opinions within the church, as its “ancestor churches” often did. For instance, in the late 1950s 
and 1960s there was a substantial “Lutheran left.” Many Lutheran pastors and lay people 
protested the Vietnam War, and some were involved in civil rights work. Due to their more 
liberal philosophy, many of them also expressed concerns about what they saw as deficiencies 
within the church. They argued for a fuller integration of homosexuals, for instance, and called 
for more liberal stances on social issues. Rather than splitting off from the church body, their 
views were incorporated into an ongoing process of dialogue within the community (Erling 
2003, p. 57-9).  
                                                 
9
 For an elaboration of this position, see Luther’s “Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed.” The 
original social statements of the Lutheran Church in America affirm this position (see W. Kent Gilbert, Commitment 
to Unity: A History of the Lutheran Church in America), as does the current ELCA Statement on Church and Society.  
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The incorporation of varying views is manifested especially in the statements that the 
ELCA issues. As a matter of policy, two different kinds of statements are issued. Social 
Statements, issued by the ELCA’s Churchwide Assembly, are broader descriptions of the 
church’s approach to an enduring issue, such as abortion or the environment. Messages, on the 
other hand, are adopted by the ELCA Church Council and apply the principles in these Social 
Statements to more particular issues such as the changing face of Europe. Importantly, however, 
these messages generally do not defend any particular policy approach. In many cases, they 
mention a current event or set of events and reference different principles that could be applied to 
that event.  While Focus on the Family removes biblical verses and policy positions from their 
traditional contexts, the ELCA seeks precisely to embed policy controversies in the 
hermeneutical tradition within which they can be evaluated. 
These statements are the product of discussion within the ELCA, and reflect the church’s 
approach to a variety of social issues (Gilbert 1988, p. 134-5).10 As such, they reflect the 
discussion that takes place within the ELCA and indicate the ELCA’s recognition of and strong 
support for a substantial diversity of specific policy stances.  In its “Social Statement on Church 
and Society,” the ELCA states that the church should be “a community where open, passionate, 
and respectful deliberation on challenging and controversial issues of contemporary society is 
expected and encouraged,” and “address through deliberative processes the issues faced by the 
people of God in order to equip them in their discipleship and citizenship in the world.” 
Correspondingly, in many of its statements regarding controversial issues, the church emphasizes 
that the multiplicity of reason- and faith-derived foundational principles applied to a particular 
case can and does generate reasonable disagreement. 
                                                 
10
 Gilbert discusses social statements in the context of the then-newly-formed Lutheran Church in America. These 
social statements continued to exist once the ELCA was formed, fulfilling the same function. The ELCA’s Social 
Statements can be found at: <http://www.elca.org/SocialStatements/> 
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In addition to its broad statement on the church and society, I have chosen to highlight 
four particular statements from the ELCA: Abortion, Sexuality, Homelessness and Economic 
Life. These statements express the church’s convictions with regard to abortion, homosexuality 
and poverty. I use these statements in order to emphasize how the ELCA’s approach differs 
strongly from the approach taken by Focus. Significant excerpts from these statements can be 
found in Table 1.1, on page 30.  
 In its Social Statement on Abortion, the ELCA demonstrates its deliberative emphasis. 
Though it contends that the fetus does possess some form of moral agency, the statement does 
not move from this claim to a definitive policy resolution. Instead, it affirms two principles. 
First, it cautions against what it perceives as absolutist rhetoric emerging from the pro-life and 
pro-choice movements, instead contending that the principles utilized by both pro-life and pro-
choice individuals deserve respect and consideration. It states, for instance, that “the language 
used in discussing abortion should ignore neither the value of unborn life nor the value of the 
woman and her other relationships.” Similarly, “this church encourages its members to 
participate in the public debate on abortion in a spirit of respect for those with whom they differ” 
(“Abortion,” 1991).  
Second, the Social Statement on Abortion devotes attention to practical issues that it 
believes both movements tend to ignore, such as caring for pregnant women and offering various 
forms of aid that diminish the perceived need for abortions.  They write: “Our ministry of 
hospitality to all people ought to include women who have had abortions, women who are 
considering abortions, children, families, and those who bear and raise children under all kinds 
of circumstances.” The church appears to take no stand on the legal status of abortion 
(“Abortion,” 1991). 
Religion and the Political Sphere 43 
 
It is interesting, and perhaps telling, that there is no ELCA Social Statement or Message 
devoted specifically to homosexuality. Homosexuality is mentioned only in passing, and its 
mention occurs in the context of a broader Message on Sexuality (“Sexuality,” 1996). In direct 
contrast with Focus on the Family, questions regarding homosexuality are not uprooted from the 
context of sexuality in which they belong, but are instead firmly anchored within a broader 
discussion of what human sexuality ought to be (“Sexuality,” 1996). Though the Message 
explicitly defines marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman, there are three 
significant differences between the ELCA’s analysis and that of Focus. 
First of all, there is no explicit mention anywhere in the document of policy implications. 
Therefore, even to the extent that the statement takes a kind of definitive position, it makes no 
assumption that its position translates unquestionably into particular policies for a democratic 
state to enact. Second, the document explicitly acknowledges the “strong and legitimate 
disagreements” between Lutherans on issues of sexuality, and admits that “differences and 
disagreements [over homosexuality] were at times sharp” (“Sexuality,” 1996). Importantly, the 
Message does not explicitly take either side in these disagreements. This represents a huge 
change from Focus’ approach, because it acknowledges that not only are there are legitimate 
differences of opinion to be had, but that there are legitimate differences within the church itself. 
This further illustrates the idea that the ELCA embraces the notion of a community in which 
participants acknowledge disagreements without demonizing or dismissing the viewpoints of 
those who disagree with them. 
 With regard to poverty and homelessness, the church’s approach is slightly different in 
that it is willing to take a more definitive stance. Its statements in this regard (Economic Life and 
Homelessness) are derived from the Greek Bible and from prophetic texts in the Hebrew Bible, 
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and those statements begin from the premise that individuals, communities, and states have a 
strong obligation to “care for homeless people as God cares for all” (“Homelessness,” 1990) and 
to carry out “acts of justice for the sake of the most vulnerable” (“Sufficient, Sustainable 
Livelihood for All,” 1999).  Admittedly, there is some diversity of approaches when it comes to 
policy implications. Both statements contend that the government needs to be involved in some 
way, though the two statements part ways in their levels of specificity. The Message on 
Homelessness neglects to specify any particular policy that the government ought to adopt, as the 
“Gospel does not provide ready-made solutions to homelessness.”  
The Statement on Economic Life, in contrast, gets slightly more specific in its advocacy, 
expressing explicit support for “investments, loan funds, hiring practices, skill training, and 
funding of micro-enterprises,” along with “correction of regressive tax systems, so that people 
are taxed progressively in relation to their ability to pay” (“Sufficient, Sustainable Livelihood for 
All,” 1999). Two points are worth making here, however. First, the ELCA refuses to embrace a 
consistently conservative or consistently liberal approach to poverty. To the extent that it 
supports policy positions, those positions appear to be a synthesis of liberalism and 
conservatism, such that neither conservatives nor liberals can claim a monopoly on truth with 
regard to poverty. Second, as is consistent with their Social Statement on Church and Society, 
the ELCA never presupposes that the particular policies they allude to follow incontestably and 
inescapably from the foundational premises that the community embraces. Though the 
committee does mention particular policies that they support, they ultimately aim at defending 
policies that keep the needs of the poor in mind, whatever those policies may be. In this regard, 
the ELCA seems no more dogmatic than any group which embraces any advocacy. Because the 
statement never claims that the policies in question follow inescapably from a desire to aid the 
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poor (and the statement on Homelessness explicitly denies any such inescapable link), it appears 
that the ELCA would be entirely willing to alter its position if the policies that it referenced 
would be unsuccessful in fighting poverty. 
In direct contrast with Focus on the Family, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 
appears to correspond fairly closely to MacIntyre’s understanding of a tradition, in two critical 
ways. First, it embeds discussion of particular issues within a broader context. Instead of 
justifying positions through use of isolated biblical verses, it derives positions on issues through 
a kind of dialectical process which attempts to glean overarching principles from a variety of 
different texts, and which attempts to place overarching principles into dialogue with the 
observed world.  Second, throughout that dialectical process, the ELCA recognizes and even 
celebrates the reasonable disagreements which foster an ongoing process of honest deliberation. 
This, in turn, means that Rawls’s and Audi’s concerns regarding comprehensive doctrines are at 
least partially misplaced. Contrary to the broad stereotypes on which the philosophy of public 
reason relies, religious comprehensive doctrines have the capacity to promote democratic virtues 
of deliberation, humility and compromise, and in doing so, make a positive contribution to the 
democratic process. Finally, an attachment to humility and skepticism that perfection can be 
achieved in this world, two theologically-grounded principles, lead Lutherans to challenge the 
certainty that can lead to political dogmatism. 
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VIII. Conclusion/Further Research 
The evangelical social agenda is now much wider and deeper, engaging issues such as poverty 
and social justice, global warming, HIV/AIDS, sex trafficking, genocide in Darfur and the ethics 
of the war in Iraq. 
- Jim Wallis, The Great Awakening (2008), p. 5 
 The philosophy of public reason wields substantial influence in modern American 
political philosophy. However, the idea that a citizen of a liberal democracy should always have 
a sufficient reason grounded either in secular reason specifically, or an overlapping consensus of 
the society generally, rests on deeply problematic premises. One of these, as critics have 
frequently argued, is the practical and moral impossibility of eliminating particular 
comprehensive doctrines from political dialogue. 
 Additionally, however, I have argued that proponents of public reason and secular reason 
alike rest their case on an unnecessarily uncharitable understanding of religion. They fail to 
distinguish between faith-based advocacy organizations, whose influences can indeed be 
destructive, and faith traditions, which have the capability to satisfy and promote important 
democratic values of deliberation and compromise. As a result, liberal theory is mistaken when it 
argues against the presence of religious arguments in the political sphere.   
 The fatal flaw in many liberal treatments of religion is that they fail to comprehend the 
complexity and creativity that often characterizes religion. Many of these complexities merit 
further research, and though there regrettably was not adequate space to give these newfound 
complexities the treatment they deserve, I find it worthwhile to highlight directions that future 
research should take.  
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Many traditionally-dismissed religious groups deserve (and are beginning to get) a 
second look. Significant sections of the evangelical community, a group frequently depicted as a 
narrowly conservative population, are beginning to reclaim some of their trans-partisan roots.  
Pastor Jim Wallis’ book God’s Politics, in which he urges Christian believers to speak out 
against poverty and oppression as well as broken families and communities, has been extremely 
popular among evangelicals, and may be critical in defining a new direction for evangelical 
Christianity. Some evangelical groups have spoken out in favor of environmental protection, and 
evangelical support was essential to the passing of the 1998 International Religious Freedom 
Act. 
Simultaneously, there exists evidence to suggest that evangelicals as a group are not 
inherently as extreme or uncompromising as they are typically believed to be, even though they 
are influenced by vocal extremist voices (many of them from the very faith-based advocacy 
organizations which I have discussed) (Smith 2000; Wolfe 2003).  Moreover, some even argue 
that the organizations themselves have begun to moderate in some ways (Lester 2008, p. 27, 30). 
Though it is far from clear that (for instance) the supplementing of biblical language with ethical 
analysis on Focus’ website signals a greater willingness for evangelical groups to engage with 
those who disagree with them, this possibility should be explored. 
As observers dating back to Tocqueville have noted, religion plays an extremely 
significant role in American society. Tragically, however, liberal political theorists often argue 
that religion should not play a significant role in political argumentation. In so doing, they reveal 
a profound misunderstanding of the diversity within religion and miss the positive contribution 
that religious faith traditions can make to political discourse. 
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